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A B S T R A C T
The uncanny valley is a term used to describe the phenomenon that human simulations that are nearly but not
quite realistic often give viewers an uneasy, eerie feeling. Given the prevalence of computer-animated human
characters and a narrative framework in videogames, serious games, and health-related scenarios, it is important
to examine how the uncanny valley influences narrative empathy and enjoyment. In a 2× 2×2 between-
groups posttest-only experiment, 738 participants took the role of a patient in a virtual consultation with a
doctor; the consultation varied in the doctor's character (hero or villain), its subplot ending (happy or tragic),
and its depiction (computer animated or real). The participants' posttest results showed greater emotional
empathy and enjoyment in the hero condition and no significant difference in emotional empathy for the
computer animation but greater narrative enjoyment and persuasion. Just endings (hero rewarded, villain
punished) elicited much greater pleasure than unjust endings. In comparing computer animation with recorded
video, emotional empathy was a significantly stronger predictor of narrative enjoyment than transportation only
for the real hero with a tragic ending. The enjoyment and persuasiveness of the computer-animated doc-
tor–patient consultation bodes well for the use of animation in interactive visual narratives.
1. Introduction
Viewers have reported a lack of empathy for 3D computer modeled
characters in animated films and videogames (Misselhorn, 2009). A
lack of empathy manifests emotionally as an inability to like, identify
with, or relate to a character (Cohen, 2001; Raney, 2004). Instead of
empathy, viewers experience cold, eerie feelings. Mori (1970/2012)
termed this phenomenon bukimi no tani, which has been translated as
the uncanny valley. Uncanny denotes the eeriness of human imposters,
and valley denotes Mori's observation that intermediate and incon-
sistent levels of human realism are perceived more negatively than
lower and higher levels. Some studies have corroborated this observa-
tion in robotics (Mathur & Reichling, 2016; Wang & Rochat, 2017) and
others in film, where nearly realistic characters appear eerier than
cartoonish or human-acted characters (Ho & MacDorman, 2017;
Kätsyri, Mäkäräinen, & Takala, 2017). How do we explain this phe-
nomenon?
I have proposed that the perceptual mismatch hypothesis explains
the uncanny valley: As modelers and animators try to imbue a character
with perfect human realism, its attainment varies in difficulty by fea-
ture, resulting in some features appearing more realistic than others;
these mismatches in perceived human realism elicit eeriness
(MacDorman, Green, Ho, & Koch, 2009). Moore (2012) showed how
this effect can be represented mathematically using a Bayesian model of
category perception, since elaborated in realism inconsistency theory
(Chattopadhyay & MacDorman, 2016). A potential mechanism for the
effect is prediction error in the brain associated with violated neural
expectancies (Cheetham, Suter, & Jäncke, 2011; MacDorman &
Ishiguro, 2006; Saygin, Chaminade, Ishiguro, Driver, & Frith, 2012).
Experimental findings have supported the perceptual mismatch hy-
pothesis for features including shape, texture, movement, and speech
(MacDorman & Chattopadhyay, 2016; Meah & Moore, 2014; Mitchell
et al., 2011; Seyama & Nagayama, 2007; Tinwell, Grimshaw, Abdel
Nabi, & Williams, 2011). Other diverse explanations of the uncanny
valley have been reviewed elsewhere (Kätsyri, Förger, Mäkäräinen, &
Takala, 2015; Lay, Brace, Pike, & Pollick, 2016).
I focus instead on the heretofore unexamined question of how the
uncanny valley affects empathy for characters in an interactive visual
narrative and, as a result, narrative enjoyment. The question is im-
portant because the global videogame market is enormous ($108.9
billion in 2017 and projected to grow to $128.5 billion in 2020;
McDonald, 2017), and AAA videogames tend to combine computer-
animated characters and a narrative framework. This combination also
appears in serious games, including health-related interventions (Lu,
2015).
Empathy denotes the viewer's ability to step into a character's life, to
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infer beliefs, motivations, and intentions from the character's actions,
and to experience similar feelings and bodily sensations (de Vignemont
& Singer, 2006; Hoffman, 2000; Preston & de Waal, 2002). Empathy
engages cognitive, emotional, and somatic processing in the brain
(Blair, 2005; Decety & Moriguchi, 2007). Cognitive perspective-taking,
also known as theory of mind, is the ability to imagine and reason about
someone else's mental state in a real or hypothetical situation (Davis,
1983; Frith, 2001; Leslie, 1987). Emotional empathy is the ability to
experience someone else's emotional state as distinct from one's own
(i.e., unlike emotion contagion; Coplan, 2004; Hatfield, Cacioppo, &
Rapson, 1993; Moriguchi et al., 2007; Nummenmaa, Hirvonen,
Parkkola, & Hietanen, 2008). It may lead to sympathy and the desire to
help. Somatic (or motor) empathy is the ability to sense, mimic, or
synchronize with someone else's movements nonconsciously (Carr,
Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999;
Kupferberg, Huber, & Glasauer, 2011). While the uncanny valley has
been observed anecdotally to inhibit emotional empathy for computer-
animated characters and, in turn, narrative enjoyment, little is known
of its effect on cognitive perspective-taking (MacDorman, Srinivas, &
Patel, 2013; Misselhorn, 2009). The influence of the uncanny valley on
emotional empathy, sympathy, and cognitive perspective-taking in vi-
sual narratives demands further investigation.
If the uncanny valley alters how emotional empathy functions, this
could disrupt enjoyment of the story. What happens if the eyes of a 3D
computer-animated character are perceived as dead and soulless? If the
character plays the hero in the story, the hero may no longer be per-
ceived as a hero, thus causing the story to fall apart. This disrupts the
viewer's appreciation and enjoyment of the visual narrative. I propose
that this disruption is asymmetrical: In visual narratives, the uncanny
valley prevents a hero from functioning as a hero, but it does not pre-
vent a villain from functioning as a villain. Villains can be—and often
are meant to be—cold-hearted creeps, unworthy of empathy.1
How the uncanny valley disrupts emotional empathy, and its sup-
port of narrative enjoyment, is explained by affective disposition theory
(Zillmann, 2006; Zillmann & Cantor, 1977). Liking a character, that is,
having a positive affective disposition, causes the viewer to hope for the
character's benefit and to fear its harm; disliking a character produces
the opposite effect (Raney, 2004). Which characters are worthy of our
affection is determined by many factors including judgments about
their motives and behavior. A character is liked whose motives and
behavior align with the viewer's norms of morality, worldview, and
other allegiances. Antiheroes notwithstanding (Shafer & Raney, 2012),
a liked character typically exhibits benevolence while a disliked char-
acter typically exhibits malevolence. Together, liked and disliked
characters constitute the heroes and villains of stories. Thus, narrative
enjoyment occurs when these characters get—after a period of conflict
and suspense—what they justly deserve.
I propose that, by altering how emotional empathy functions for a
hero, the uncanny valley creates misalignments between the potential
outcomes the story would have the viewer wish for or fear and their
later fulfilment or avoidance. To build and resolve conflict, a story re-
quires our emotional commitment to characters and our desire for them
to overcome obstacles to attain goals. Without these, it no longer cap-
tivates.
In our 2× 2×2 between-groups experiment, each participant was
presented with an interactive visual narrative (Fig. 1). The participant
assumed the role of a patient in a doctor's consultation in which dia-
betes is offered as an explanation of high blood sugar results. The doctor
was either a 3D computer model or a real human and either a bene-
volent hero or a malevolent villain. The narrative concluded with the
doctor receiving either a fellowship in the happy ending or being sued
for malpractice in the tragic ending.
1.1. Hypotheses
Emotional empathy will be greater for the hero than for the villain (H1).
This prediction follows from affective disposition theory: Heroes en-
gender empathy because their words and deeds align with the viewer's
morals and worldview (Raney, 2004; Zillmann & Cantor, 1977). By
contrast, antiheroes engender empathy only after a justification suffi-
cient to warrant moral disengagement (Shafer & Raney, 2012). No such
justification was provided for the villain in the doctor–patient con-
sultation, and thus empathy for the villain should be inhibited.
Emotional empathy will be greater for the hero in the real consultation
than in the computer-animated consultation (H2A) but no different for the
villain (H2B). Although heroes typically engender empathy, the per-
ceptual and cognitive processes underlying the uncanny valley effect
are expected to suppress empathy for the computer-animated hero.
Because villains are less likely to engender empathy, these processes
should have little effect on empathy for the computer-animated villain.
Anecdotal evidence indicates heroes are more susceptible to the loss of
empathy associated with the uncanny valley (Butler & Joschko, 2009;
Freedman, 2012; Zibrek, Kokkinara, & McDonnell, 2018). Note that the
computer-animated doctor used in this study had been previously rated
as significantly more eerie than its human counterpart (Patel &
MacDorman, 2015).
Ending pleasure (H3A) and narrative enjoyment of the consultation
(H3B) will be greater for the just endings (hero happy, villain tragic) than for
the unjust endings (hero tragic, villain happy). H3A replicates Zillmann
and Cantor's (1977, Table 1) prediction and finding that a happy ending
for the hero or tragic ending for the villain elicited a positive affective
response while a happy ending for the villain or tragic ending for the
hero elicited a negative affective response. H3B extrapolates from this
prediction to the overall enjoyment of the narrative.
Emotional empathy will predict narrative enjoyment more strongly for
the real hero than for the computer-animated hero with the happy ending
(H4A) or with the tragic ending (H4B). There will be no difference for the
human villain and the computer-animated villain with the happy ending
(H4C) or with the tragic ending (H4D). Affective disposition theory as-
sumes that narrative enjoyment requires emotional empathy for the
Fig. 1. In the role of a patient in a virtual consultation, the participant inter-
acted with a doctor whose Character was hero or villain, subplot Ending was
happy or tragic, and Depiction was computer animated or real. A 2×2×2
between-groups posttest-only experimental design was used.
1 How realism influences eeriness depends in part on the character's person-
ality and narrative. For example, Zibrek, Kokkinara, and McDonnell (2018)
designed a ‘zombie’ rendering style to be perceived as eerie; however, they
found it was only perceived as eerie when paired with an agreeable personality.
This indicates that heroic characters are more vulnerable to the uncanny valley
than villains.
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hero but antipathy for the villain (Raney, 2004; Zillmann & Cantor,
1977). Thus, the uncanny valley is expected to alter only how empathy
for the hero doctor influences enjoyment. Misselhorn (2009) proposed
how the uncanny valley could interfere with empathy: Perception of a
computer-animated human repeatedly activates the concept human, but
the concept is immediately suppressed because the viewer knows the
character is not human. MacDorman and Entezari (2015) proposed that
the successive activation and inhibition of the concept human could
elicit free-floating anxiety: The viewer experiences the character's per-
ceived “suffering” but is unable to attribute it to the nonhuman im-
poster. (The perceived cause of the suffering could be, for example, a
nonhuman feature or negative event.) Mangan (2015) and Freud
(1919/2003) have also argued that the source of uncanniness may be
unspecified or suppressed. Thus, the uncanny valley could diminish
enjoyment by reducing empathy or increasing anxiety or other negative
emotions.
2. Methods
A doctor's bedside manner, personal outcome, and depiction were
manipulated in a web-based experiment and virtual consultation to
examine whether Character (hero or villain), Ending (happy or tragic),
and Realism (computer animated or real) influence Empathy, Ending
Pleasure, and Enjoyment; and whether Empathy influences Enjoyment
and Persuasion. Character was manipulated through the doctor's
spoken words, voice and prosody, facial expressions, and body move-
ments. Ending was manipulated through a subplot culminating in the
doctor being either honored with a fellowship or sued for malpractice.
Realism was manipulated by using either a recorded video of a real
actor to play the doctor in a consultation room or computer-animated
3D models to simulate the same scenario.
2.1. Participant characteristics and sampling
The sample was comprised of randomly selected undergraduate and
graduate students, age 18 or older, from a Midwestern U.S. public
university system with the following demographics: 68.6% White, 6.8%
Hispanic/Latino, 6.8% African American, 4.4% Asian, 3.6% two or
more races, 0.1% American Indian, 0.1% Pacific Islander, 0.6% un-
known, and 9.1% international. Participation was voluntary and oc-
curred at a time and location chosen by the participant.
The study was approved by the university's Office of Research
Administration (January 5, 2018, OHRP Category 7, Study No.
1712290464). Informed consent was obtained from all participants.
Documentation of informed consent was waived under 45 CFR
46.117(c) or 21 CFR 56.109(c)(1). Explanation of aspects of the ex-
periment that could have affected its outcome was delayed until after
participation under 45 CFR 46.116(d). The research was performed in
accordance with all relevant federal, state, and university standards,
policies, and regulations on human subjects research.
2.2. Research design
The experiment had a 2×2×2 between-groups posttest-only de-
sign (Independent Variables). Each participant was randomly assigned
to one of eight treatment groups, representing either a low or high level
of warmth, competence, and realism.
2.3. Procedure
Each participant assumed the role of a patient in a virtual con-
sultation (Appendix A). The scenario began with the patient's blood
sugar testing higher than normal and a subplot culminating in a happy
or tragic ending for Dr. Richards. The doctor appeared in a video
wearing a white shirt, tie, and lab coat with a stethoscope draped on his
shoulders. He was standing and holding a clipboard with the patient's
test results. The consultation proceeded through seven doctor–patient
exchanges and a final response from the doctor. These constituted (hero
or villain) Character Treatments 1–8 and (computer animated or real)
Realism Treatments 1–8. The consultation ended with (happy or tragic)
Ending Treatment 2, which was a whispered announcement from the
nurse to the doctor and his response.
Approximately 60% of Dr. Richards' dialogue (337 of 553–561
words) was identical between the hero and villain Character
Treatments. In this dialogue, Dr. Richards interpreted the patient's test
results as possibly indicating diabetes and invited the patient for a
retest. He also explained type 1 and type 2 diabetes and their symp-
toms, complications, biological mechanism, and treatments.
In each doctor–patient exchange, the participant replied to the
doctor by choosing one of four text-based responses. To maintain ex-
perimental control, the doctor's statements were phrased to follow lo-
gically from any of the preceding responses. After the consultation, the
participant completed posttest indices (Dependent Variables).
Table 1
MANOVA of independent variables on dependent variables, effect sizes, and post-hoc tests.
IV DV MANOVA (Univariate) Effect Sizes and Post-Hoc Tests
SS F p
p
2 Mdiff SE df t ptukey
Character
(Hero–Villain)
Identification 1.22 6.86 .009 .01 −0.08 0.03 730 −2.69 .007
Empathy 12.56 84.82 < .001 .10 0.26 0.03 730 9.18 < .001
Sympathy 17.16 97.91 < .001 .12 0.30 0.03 730 9.84 < .001
Cognitive P.-t. 6.12 132.29 < .001 .15 0.18 0.02 730 11.51 < .001
Persuasion 34.72 274.38 < .001 .27 0.43 0.03 730 16.47 < .001
Ending Pleasure 1.40 9.56 .002 .01 0.07 0.03 730 2.57 .010
Enjoyment 1.47 11.19 < .001 .01 0.09 0.03 730 3.25 .001
Ending
(Happy–Tragic)
Empathy 0.60 4.04 .045 .01 0.06 0.03 730 2.01 .044
Persuasion 0.80 6.35 .012 .01 0.06 0.03 730 2.43 .015
Ending Pleasure 1.23 8.45 .004 .01 0.08 0.03 730 2.77 .006
Enjoyment 1.34 10.20 .001 .01 0.08 0.03 730 3.14 .002
Depiction (Real–Anim.) Persuasion 1.09 8.64 .003 .01 0.08 0.03 730 2.94 .003
Enjoyment 1.45 11.04 < .001 .01 −0.09 0.03 730 −3.33 < .001
Character× Ending
(Just–Unjust)
Cognitive P.-t. 0.23 4.88 .027 .07 −0.04 0.02 730 −2.23 .026
Ending Pleasure 20.79 142.27 < .001 .16 0.34 0.03 730 11.97 < .001
Note: N=738. Nonsignificant effects omitted.
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2.4. Independent variables
The independent variables were Character (hero or villain), Ending
(happy or tragic), and Realism (computer animated or real). These
constituted the eight treatment conditions. The video clips are available
at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.7300088.
Character. Approximately 40% of the doctor's dialogue reflected the
doctor's bedside manner, which was either heroic or villainous. The
hero treatments included expressions of caring, encouragement, praise,
and confidence in the patient and treatment; offers of availability and
support; and recommendations of external resources. The villain
treatments included complaining about others, using disparaging and
offensive language, showing a lack of availability, demeaning and dis-
couraging the patient, cracking a joke at the patient's expense, and
assuming the patient has petrifying fears and ingrained habits.
Ending. A happy or tragic ending subplot was set up immediately
before the virtual consultation. First, the participant overheard another
patient in the waiting room discussing a malpractice lawsuit and sub-
sequently, the nurse called the patient back and mentioned that the
doctor is up for an award. These events were framed more or less fa-
vorably in the happy or tragic version of Ending Treatment 1. The
subplot culminated near the end of the consultation. In the happy
condition, Nurse Larsson announced, “Great news, Dr. Richards! The
American College of Physicians is honoring you with a Fellowship!” In
the tragic condition, Nurse Larsson announced, “Bad news, Dr.
Richards! Meredith Pratley decided to go ahead with the malpractice
lawsuit.”
Justice. A just ending is defined as a happy ending for the hero or an
unhappy ending for the villain. An unjust ending is defined conversely.
Depiction. The entire virtual consultation was either real or com-
puter animated (Realism Treatment); however, both versions used the
same recording, namely, the real voice of the actor playing Dr. Richards
and off-screen actress playing Nurse Larsson. The high-realism treat-
ment used a recorded video of the actor (Fig. 1). The low-realism
treatment used a computer model developed from high-resolution re-
ference photographs of the same actor. The actor's clothing, props, and
environment were all developed the same way. The computer models
were animated manually using the real video as a reference. The ani-
mated Dr. Richards' lips were synchronized to the real actor's speech.
The same computer model had been used in a different scenario with an
earlier cohort of students and found to be significantly more eerie than
the real actor (Patel & MacDorman, 2015).
2.5. Dependent variables
The semantic differential scales comprising the posttest indices are
listed in Appendix B. The indices represent averages of interval data
from visual analogue scales (Funke & Reips, 2012; Reips & Funke,
2008). Each measurement scale was represented by an adjective (or
phrase) and its antonym on opposite ends of a horizontal bar. The
participant placed a mark on the bar, and depending on where the mark
was placed, a decimal value between −3.00 and 3.00 was recorded for
the scale. Likert scales were also implemented as visual analogue scales
with Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree on opposite ends of the hor-
izontal bar as the only labels. Index and scale order were randomized.
Transportation. An 11-item assessment of narrative transportation
(Rodgers & Thorson, 2012) was designed to measure the intensity of
absorption in the consultation.
Identification as Patient. An 8-item assessment of emotional identi-
fication (Cohen, 2001) was designed to measure the intensity of the
experience of being the patient.
Empathy (emotional). A 7-item assessment of emotional empathy
(Coplan, 2004; Hatfield et al., 1993; Moriguchi et al., 2007;
Nummenmaa et al., 2008) was designed to measure the intensity of the
experience of Dr. Richards' emotional state as distinct from the parti-
cipant's own emotional state.
Sympathy. A 6-item assessment of sympathy—also called empathic
concern (Batson, 1987; Batson et al., 1991; Davis, 1983)—was designed
to measure the degree to which the participant emotionally cared about
Dr. Richards' welfare.
Cognitive Perspective-taking. An 11-item assessment of cognitive
perspective-taking—also called theory of mind (Davis, 1983; Frith,
2001; Leslie, 1987)—was designed to measure the ability to imagine
and reason about Dr. Richards' cognitive state; each item had a correct
or incorrect answer.
Persuasion. To measure persuasion, intention to adhere to Dr.
Richards' treatment advice was measured using an Adherence Intention
index designed for this virtual doctor–patient consultation.
Enjoyment. Narrative appreciation of the consultation was measured
using an enjoyment index. To create it, the program evaluation index
(Perry, Jenzowsky, Hester, King, & Yi, 1997) was converted from in-
tensity scales to semantic differential scales by adding antonyms.
3. Results
3.1. Participants
Overall, 738 participants randomly assigned to eight groups, with
88–105 in each group, completed the experiment (73% female,
n=538).
3.2. Recruitment period and baseline
The experiment was conducted from January 15 to March 10, 2018.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 82 (Mdn=23, IQR=[20, 29])
and most had grown up in the United States (88%, n=647).
3.3. Data analysis preliminaries
Test statistics were two tailed and interpreted at a .05 significance
level. Partial eta squared ( p2) was interpreted with small= .01,
medium= .06, and large= .14 thresholds (Cohen, 1973) and Cron-
bach's α with acceptable= .7, good= .8, and excellent= .9 thresh-
olds. For the path analysis of the structural models, criteria for accep-
table global fit were p > .05 for model 2 (cannot reject the exact fit
hypothesis), RMSEA≤ .08 (a cutoff for marginal fit; MacCallum,
Browne, & Sugawara, 1996), RMSEA ˆL =0 (confidence interval in-
cludes zero); and the combination rule (CFI≥ .95 and SRMR≤ .08; Hu
& Bentler, 1999). Factor analysis used oblimin rotation. All betas (β)
were standardized. Correlations and path analysis were performed in
Lavaan 0.6 and other analyses in Jamovi 0.9.
3.4. Index reliability
Scales were interval data. The scales of Cognitive Perspective-taking
disguised a test because each scale had a correct or an incorrect answer;
the index was an unweighted average of these scales. The remaining
indices were averages of their respective scales weighted by their factor
loadings to measure more accurately their latent concept (Appendix B).
In averaging the indices, raw data, which ranged from −3.00 to 3.00,
was rescaled to range from −1 to 1.
3.5. Testing hypotheses 1–3
Using Pillai's trace, a three-way MANOVA found a significant effect
of Character, V=0.33, F(7, 724)= 51.89, p < .001; Ending,
V=0.02, F(7, 724)= 2.62, p < .011; Depiction, V=0.05, F(7,
724)= 5.06, p < .001; and Character× Ending, V=0.18, F(7,
724)= 22.08, p < .001, on the narrative-related variables:
Identification as Patient, Transportation, Empathy, Sympathy,
Cognitive Perspective-taking, Persuasion, Ending Pleasure, and
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Enjoyment. The univariate tests were conducted to test the main and
interaction effects of Character, Ending, and Depiction (Table 1). There
were no significant effects on Transportation.
Character had a significant main effect on Cognitive Perspective-
taking and Persuasion with a large effect size, on Empathy and
Sympathy with a medium effect size, and on Identification, Ending
Pleasure, and Enjoyment with a small effect size (Fig. 2). Post-hoc tests
(Tukey's HSD) showed that the hero doctor was rated lower than the
villain doctor on Identification as Patient and higher on the remaining
variables with significant effects.
H1 predicted greater emotional empathy for the hero than for the
villain. H1 was supported.
Ending had a significant main effect on Empathy, Persuasion,
Ending Pleasure, and Enjoyment with a small effect size. The happy
ending was rating higher than the tragic ending on these variables.
Depiction had a significant main effect on Persuasion and
Enjoyment with a small effect size. The computer-animated consulta-
tion was more persuasive and enjoyable than the real consultation.
H2A predicted greater emotional empathy for the real hero than for
the computer-animated hero. H2A was not supported. H2B predicted no
difference in emotional empathy for the real villain and computer-
animated villain. H2B was supported.
Character× Ending had a significant interaction effect on Cognitive
Perspective-taking and Ending Pleasure. Post-hoc tests were coded
using Justice. Cognitive Perspective-taking was nonsignificant. The just
endings (hero happy, villain tragic) were more pleasurable than the
unjust endings (hero tragic, villain happy) with a large effect size
(Fig. 3).
H3A predicted greater ending pleasure for the just endings. H3A
was supported. H3B predicted greater narrative enjoyment for the just
endings. H3B was not supported.
3.6. Regression models of enjoyment
Multiple linear regression was performed to predict Enjoyment from
the other narrative-related variables. Predictor variables were sequen-
tially removed in order of p value, from largest to smallest, starting with
Cognitive Perspective-taking, t=0.58, p= .56, β= .02, R2= .42, and
Sympathy, t=1.48, p= .14, β= .06, R2= .42. Models were identified
with four, three, two, and one predictor variables (Table 2).
3.7. Testing hypothesis 4
To determine whether Empathy predicts Enjoyment differently be-
tween the computer-animated and real consultations for each of the
four narratives, four ANOVAs were performed comparing the regression
coefficients of Model 1. This analysis was repeated for Models 2, 3, and
4 (Table 3).
The results are consistent across all four models: Only for hero tragic
ending does Empathy predict Enjoyment differently (p= .002 to .017):
Empathy predicts Enjoyment more strongly in the real consultation
than in the computer-animated consultation. In Model 3, for example,
the standardized β for Empathy is .30 higher (computer animated:
β= .25, p < .001, vs. real: β= .55, p < .001), and the standardized β
for Transportation is .19 lower (computer animated: β= .48, p < .001,
vs. real: β= .27, p < .001). In Model 4, the standardized β for
Empathy is .28 higher (computer animated: β= .24, p < .001, vs. real:
β= .52, p < .001), and the standardized β for Transportation is .21
lower (computer animated: β= .48, p < .001, vs. real: β= .27,
p < .001).
Hypothesis 4 predicts emotional empathy as a stronger predictor of
narrative enjoyment with the real hero than with the computer-ani-
mated hero with both the happy (H4A) and tragic endings (H4B). Only
H4B was supported. It further predicts no difference for the human
villain and the computer-animated villain with the happy (H4C) and
tragic endings (H4D). H4C and H4D were supported.
3.8. Structural models of enjoyment
To visualize directed dependencies among dependent variables of
theoretical interest, a structural model was developed from regression
Model 3, which had direct effects from Empathy, Transportation, and
Ending Pleasure to Enjoyment. Direct effects were added from
Transportation and Ending Pleasure to Empathy. Standardized betas for
this just-identified model were calculated for the eight conditions:
Character× Ending×Depiction. Empathy, Transportation, and Ending
Pleasure varied across conditions (Fig. 4).
For hero happy ending, Ending Pleasure had a direct effect on
Empathy with a large effect size. That is, feeling pleasure when the hero
doctor is to be awarded a fellowship predicts emotional empathy.
Transportation had a direct effect on Empathy with a small-to-medium
effect size. Transportation had a direct effect on Enjoyment with a
medium effect size. For computer animated, Empathy had a stronger
direct effect on Enjoyment (.52 vs. .36), Ending Pleasure had a non-
significant direct effect on Enjoyment, and after removing this non-
significant direct effect, the model had excellent global fit statistics: M2
=0.014, dfM =1, p= .905, q=6, RMSEA ˆ = .000, 90%
CI= [0.000, 0.110], CFI= 1.000, SRMR= .002.
For hero tragic ending, Ending Pleasure had a negative direct effect
on Empathy. Feeling pleasure when the hero doctor is to be sued for
malpractice predicts a lack of empathy, whereas feeling displeasure
indicates empathy. As with regression Models 2–4, the effect sizes of
Transportation on Enjoyment and Empathy on Enjoyment were nearly
Fig. 2. The hero elicited significantly greater Empathy, Sympathy, Cognitive
Perspective-taking, and Enjoyment than the villain. The computer-animated
human elicited greater Enjoyment than the real human. Error bars indicate 95%
confidence interval.
Fig. 3. The just ending elicited significantly greater Ending Pleasure than the
unjust ending; however, Enjoyment overall was not significantly greater. Error
bars indicate 95% confidence interval.
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reversed between the computer-animated and real consultations. For
the computer-animated hero tragic ending, Transportation more
strongly predicted Enjoyment than Empathy predicted Enjoyment,
whereas for the real hero tragic ending, Empathy more strongly pre-
dicted Enjoyment than Transportation predicted Enjoyment. For the
computer-animated consultation only, Ending Pleasure again had a
nonsignificant direct effect on Enjoyment, and after removing this
nonsignificant direct effect, the model had excellent global fit statistics:
M
2 =0.368, dfM =1, p= .544, q=6, RMSEA ˆ = .000, 90%
CI= [0.000, 0.236], CFI= 1.000, SRMR= .012.
For villain happy ending, Empathy had a nonsignificant direct effect
on Enjoyment for both the computer-animated and real consultation,
though Ending Pleasure had a direct effect on Empathy with a large
effect size. Emotional empathy did not significantly predict narrative
enjoyment. Transportation had a significant direct effect on Empathy in
only the computer-animated consultation. For villain happy ending,
Empathy may be removed from the model with Enjoyment predicted
solely by Transportation and Ending Pleasure.
For villain tragic ending, Ending Pleasure had a nonsignificant di-
rect effect on Enjoyment. In the computer-animated consultation,
Ending Pleasure also had a nonsignificant direct effect on Empathy and
may be removed from the model. In the real consultation,
Transportation had a nonsignificant direct effect on Empathy. After
removing the two nonsignificant direct effects from the model, the
model had good global fit statistics: M2 =2.342, dfM =2, p= .310,
q=5, RMSEA ˆ = .044, 90% CI= [0.000, 0.219], CFI= .989,
SRMR= .050.
3.9. Regression models of persuasion and ANOVA
A simple regression model of Persuasion was identified with two
predictor variables (Table 4). The model was identified by removing
predictor variables sequentially in decreasing order of p value. Sym-
pathy (β= .45, p < .001) and Cognitive Perspective-taking (β= .39,
p < .001) were the strongest predictors of Persuasion. To determine
whether they predict Persuasion differently between the computer-
animated and real consultations for each of the four narratives, four
ANOVAs were performed comparing the regression coefficients of the
model (Table 5). Only for hero tragic ending does the model predict
Persuasion significantly differently between computer-animated and
real consultations (p= .027). Fig. 5 depicts the regression coefficients
by Character, Ending, and Depiction. For the real consultations, Cog-
nitive Perspective-taking is a significant predictor of Persuasion only for
happy endings, whereas for the computer-animated consultations,
Cognitive Perspective-taking is a significant predictor of Persuasion for
both happy and tragic endings.
Table 2
Model coefficients for Enjoyment.
Model F df R2 Predictor B SE βa t p
1 274.20 1, 736 .27 < .001
Intercept 0.00 .02 −0.08 .933
Empathy 0.47 .03 .52 16.56 < .001
2 240.85 2, 735 .40 < .001
Intercept −0.01 .02 −0.43 .671
Empathy 0.36 .03 .40 13.03 < .001
Transportation 0.62 .05 .37 12.31 < .001
3 167.11 3, 734 .41 < .001
Intercept −0.01 .02 −0.65 .513
Empathy 0.35 .03 .38 12.45 < .001
Transportation 0.62 .05 .38 12.44 < .001
Ending Pleasure 0.09 .03 .10 3.50 < .001
4 130.27 4, 733 .42 < .001
Intercept −0.02 .02 −1.27 .203
Empathy 0.33 .03 .36 11.73 < .001
Transportation 0.49 .06 .30 8.08 < .001
Ending Pleasure 0.09 .03 .11 3.73 < .001
Identification 0.11 .03 .13 3.49 < .001
Note: N=738.
a Standardized.
Table 3
ANOVAs comparing regression coefficients for Depiction by Character and
Ending.
Model Charact. Ending df RSS SS F p
1 Hero Happy 191, 2 13.08 0.33 2.42 .091
Hero Tragic 173, 2 15.18 0.74 4.20 .017
Villain Happy 184, 2 19.94 0.56 2.57 .079
Villain Tragic 174, 2 21.67 0.14 0.56 .572
2 Hero Happy 189, 3 10.63 0.37 2.19 .091
Hero Tragic 171, 3 11.80 1.04 5.03 .002
Villain Happy 182, 3 16.94 0.45 1.62 .186
Villain Tragic 172, 3 18.13 0.13 0.40 .755
3 Hero Happy 187, 4 10.55 0.35 1.53 .194
Hero Tragic 169, 4 11.63 1.04 3.77 .006
Villain Happy 180, 4 16.70 0.41 1.12 .350
Villain Tragic 170, 4 17.93 0.11 0.26 .905
4 Hero Happy 185, 5 10.26 0.40 1.46 .207
Hero Tragic 167, 5 11.26 1.10 3.26 .008
Villain Happy 178, 5 15.82 0.36 0.82 .538
Villain Tragic 168, 5 17.59 0.12 0.23 .949
Fig. 4. A structural model of Enjoyment by Character, Ending, and Depiction.
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3.10. Data availability
The dataset and R script for all analyses are available at https://doi.
org/10.6084/m9.figshare.7611788.
4. Discussion
As expected, emotional empathy, sympathy, cognitive perspective-
taking, persuasion, and narrative enjoyment were greater with the
heroic doctor acting as protagonist than the villainous one.
Nevertheless, participants identified more strongly with being the pa-
tient when pitted against the villain, perhaps because of the added
challenge and drama. Contrary to Banerjee and Greene's (2012) find-
ings, the happy (or progressive) ending was not more transporting. Just
endings—in which the hero received a fellowship or the villain was
sued for malpractice—were more pleasurable than unjust endings with
a large effect size. This finding aligns with affective disposition theory.
This pleasure with just endings, however, did not extend to narra-
tive enjoyment overall. Even in Zillmann and Cantor's (1977, Table 2)
original study, second and third grade students somewhat appreciated
the happy ending for the villain. This may reflect the kind of simple
narrative used in both studies, which either had a villain or a hero but
not both. The lack of overall narrative enjoyment of the villain with
tragic ending may also reflect the interactivity of the visual narrative in
which the participant personally experienced being the butt of the
villain's jokes and ridicule instead of viewing a third person experience
it—like in a film or on television.
Contrary to expectations, the computer-animated consultation was
more enjoyable and more persuasive than the real consultation, despite
the computer-animated doctor having been rated as more eerie than the
real one in a previous study (Patel & MacDorman, 2015). It is possible
that the computer animation was simply more engaging than real life
(Dai & MacDorman, 2018). Animation could also have enhanced the
experience of interactivity, because participants may have thought they
were interacting with an animated chatbot in real time. By contrast, the
videos of the real actor were clearly prerecorded.
In comparing the regression models, only for hero tragic ending did
emotional empathy predict narrative enjoyment differently, that is,
more strongly in the real consultation than in the computer-animated
one. For the computer-animated consultation, transportation instead
predicted narrative enjoyment more strongly. Transportation has been
found to be an important factor in narrative enjoyment (Green, Brock, &
Kaufman, 2004; Green, Chatham, & Sestir, 2012; Johnson, 2012). If
transportation tended to be heightened for computer animation in the
structural model, that could be explained by the perception of inter-
acting ‘live’ with an intelligent agent. It is unclear why it was prominent
specifically for computer animation in the hero tragic ending condition
as compared with emotional empathy.
For the structural model, ending pleasure predicted emotional em-
pathy positively for the happy endings and negatively for the tragic
endings, except for a nonsignificant direct effect for the computer-ani-
mated villain with a tragic ending. As an individual difference, it is not
surprising to find those who take pleasure in happy endings and dis-
pleasure in tragic endings to be more empathetic. For the villains, re-
gardless of ending, transportation predicted emotional empathy only
for computer animation. Emotional empathy had a nonsignificant direct
effect on enjoyment for the villain with happy endings, whether com-
puter animated or real, and can be removed from the model. In other
words, when villains succeed, empathy does not predict enjoyment,
which is consistent with affective disposition theory (Raney, 2004;
Zillmann & Cantor, 1977).
Cognitive Perspective-taking was the only index whose result may
be analyzed for correctness; its Likert-like visual analogue scales dis-
guised true-or-false questions about the doctor's mental state. Thus,
higher scores on the index indicate the doctor's advice was being pro-
cessed more systematically and lower scores indicate it was being
processed more heuristically (Chaiken, 1980).
For the real consultations, Cognitive Perspective-taking was a sig-
nificant predictor of Persuasion only for the happy endings in which the
doctor receives a fellowship. It was a nonsignificant predictor in the
tragic endings in which the doctor is sued for malpractice. The mal-
practice suit implies the doctor's advice may not be trustworthy or
beneficial and may thus be discounted. Therefore, it is surprising that in
all four computer-animated consultations, Cognitive-Perspective-taking
was a significant predictor of Persuasion, though the difference in re-
gression coefficients was only significant for hero tragic ending. It is
Table 4
Model coefficients for Persuasion.
Model F df R2 Predictor B SE βa t p
1 287.27 2, 735 .44 < .001
Intercept −0.03 .03 −1.20 .230
Cognitive P.-t. 0.71 .05 .39 13.92 < .001
Sympathy 0.42 .03 .45 15.92 < .001
Note: N=738.
a Standardized.
Table 5
ANOVAs comparing regression coefficients for Depiction by Character and
Ending.
Model Charact. Ending df RSS SS F p
1 Hero Happy 189, 3 12.78 0.39 1.90 .131
Hero Tragic 171, 3 15.17 0.83 3.14 .027
Villain Happy 182, 3 18.05 0.23 0.77 .510
Villain Tragic 172, 3 15.43 0.62 2.30 .079
Fig. 5. The regression model of Persuasion by Character, Ending, and
Depiction.
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possible that the participants do not view the computer-animated
doctor as an agent capable of authoring medical advice and therefore
do not connect the lawsuit to the scale items concerning their intention
to adhere to the doctor's medical advice.
A limitation of the study is not separating the positive contribution
of animation to enjoyment and persuasion from the potentially negative
contribution of the uncanny valley to these variables. A follow-up study
should include computer-animated conditions at different levels of
eeriness, for example, by varying realism or realism inconsistency as an
independent variable.
5. Conclusions
The uncanny valley theory predicts that intermediate or incon-
sistent levels of realism in human simulations may elicit a negative
affective response (Mori, 2012). This hypothesis has been supported by
empirical findings (Chattopadhyay & MacDorman, 2016; Ho &
MacDorman, 2017; Kätsyri, Mäkäräinen, & Takala, 2017; MacDorman
et al., 2009; MacDorman & Chattopadhyay, 2016; Mathur & Reichling,
2016; Mitchell et al., 2011; Seyama & Nagayama, 2007; Wang &
Rochat, 2017).
In a controlled experiment, however, the computer-animated con-
sultation with a doctor was found to be more enjoyable than the ‘real’
consultation on which it was modeled, though the effect size was small.
The uncanny valley may still negatively impact narrative enjoyment for
a different genre, such as romance. Nevertheless, for hero tragic ending,
transportation predicted enjoyment more strongly in the computer-
animated consultation and emotional empathy predicted enjoyment
more strongly in the real one. Perhaps in longer, more complex plots
with both heroes and villains experiencing numerous windfalls and
setbacks in addition to major highs and lows (Reagan, Mitchell, Kiley,
Danforth, & Dodds, 2016, Appendix E, Table S2), differences in em-
pathy for a hero experiencing misfortune could build up and affect
overall narrative enjoyment.
Interacting with the heroic doctor instead of the villainous one, or
seeing the doctor experiencing a happy ending instead of a tragic one,
also increased narrative enjoyment with a small effect size. Participants
felt the most emotional empathy for the hero; emotional empathy for
the villain with a happy ending did not significantly predict enjoyment.
Replicating Zillmann and Cantor (1977), just endings, in which the hero
is rewarded or the villain punished, were much more pleasurable than
unjust endings. However, this pleasure with the ending did not result in
greater overall narrative enjoyment. Again, in a longer, more complex
narrative, just or unjust events may function differently—for example,
with unjust events building tension and just events resolving it.
This is the first experiment to consider how character (hero or vil-
lain), ending (happy or tragic), and human realism (computer animated
or real) affect enjoyment and persuasion in light of the uncanny valley.
The experiment stands out for its degree of experimental control,
creating a computer animation based on video recordings of a real-life
scenario. The results show increased enjoyment and persuasion for the
digital double relative to a consultation filmed with a real actor. This
bodes well for the use of computer animation in videogames, serious
games, and other interactive media designed to increase health literacy
and adherence to treatment advice. Not only is it easier to revise sce-
narios that use computer animation implemented, for example, on a
game engine for real-time interaction, but they can also be combined
with artificial intelligence to provide a human-looking interface that
can answer the patient's follow-up questions.
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Appendix A. Script
Ending Treatment 1
Both: One afternoon, you visit Dr. Richards, a primary care physician, for a routine physical examination. As instructed by the nurse, Jane
Larsson, you ate nothing on the morning of your appointment.
Happy: In the waiting room, you overhear a patient, Meredith Pratley, tell her husband, “The lawyer says, if we sue the doctor, we both could
make a ton of money.”
Tragic: In the waiting room, two women are seated together, and you hear one of them say, “Meredith, you deserve compensation. You have a
strong case.”
Both: After the examination, you learn from Dr. Richards that your blood sugar tested higher than normal. You undergo some further blood work
and return to the waiting room. After a while, Nurse Larson calls you back into the doctor's office.
Happy: Walking to the office, the nurse gushes, “Dr. Richards is up for an award. Today we find out the result!”
You are greeted by Dr. Richards.
Tragic: Walking to the office, the nurse whispers, “Dr. Richards is up for an award. I'm sure it will go to his head!”
Character Treatment 1
Villain: [Rolling eyes peevishly and shaking head.] How'd you like our noisy waiting room? It sounds like the ghetto clinic where Dr. Mehta
volunteers. And they're all here for me. I inherited this disaster when she took maternity leave so …
Both: I'm sorry you were kept waiting. From your latest blood work, your fasting blood sugar level is 203, which is higher than we'd like to see. If
it tests above 126 again, we'll have to consider the possibility that you have diabetes.
Hero: But don't be too concerned. It's not clear you have it, and even if you do, it's very common, and we know how to treat it.
A. What is the chance I have diabetes?
B. When will you know for sure whether I have diabetes?
C. Will you retest my blood glucose level today?
D. Do my other lab results also indicate diabetes?
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Character Treatment 2
Hero: Again, I wouldn't be too concerned because although …
Both: Your hemoglobin A1C and triglycerides are elevated. These might be signs of diabetes or a prediabetic condition. To be sure, we'll need to
retest you. Come back at least 12 h after taking a meal without processed sugar. I want you to get the results fast, so I'll fit you in tomorrow …
Villain: If somebody cancels. Right now, I have to reserve my one open slot for a true emergency.
A. What should I know about diabetes?
B. What type of diabetes do I have?
C. Is it more likely I have type 1 or type 2 diabetes?
D. What is the difference between type 1 and type 2 diabetes?
Character Treatment 3
Villain: You should know [chuckling] it doesn't really matter what type of diabetes you have because …
Both: Diabetes, both type 1 and 2, involves your blood sugar being high enough to put your health at risk. This is due to a lack of insulin. In type 1
your body doesn't make any insulin, because the cells that make it in the pancreas have been killed by the immune system. In type 2 your body makes
some insulin, but it's either not enough or not used well. For both types, the most common symptoms are excessive thirst and frequent urination. If it
turned out you had diabetes, it's probably type 2, because of the late onset.
Hero: I certainly hope you have neither type, but type 2 is less severe and easier for us to treat.
A. I don't feel thirsty that often.
B. I don't urinate very frequently.
C. Do you have to feel thirsty and urinate frequently to have diabetes?
D. I only have one of those symptoms.
Character Treatment 4
Villain: [Incredulous.] If you're like most patients, you don't know how to assess your own symptoms and …
Both: It's possible to show no symptoms. A third of those with diabetes don't even know they have it. But it's important to get treated to keep the
symptoms from developing and to prevent complications.
Hero: I'm glad to say there are many treatments today that didn't exist 20 years ago. Our understanding of the condition is constantly improving.
A. What complications are caused by diabetes?
B. What can I do to prevent complications related to diabetes?
C. How does the disease progress?
D. Do the complications of type 2 diabetes differ from type 1?
Character Treatment 5
Villain: [Checks time on watch and scoffs] Look …
Both: The same complications are associated with both types: heart disease; kidney disease; blindness; a shortened lifespan. However, their risk
can be greatly reduced with the right treatment.
Hero: So, don't worry. If you have any health issues, we'll do [emphatically] everything we can to help you.
A. How does diabetes cause blindness?
B. Why would high blood sugar shorten my life?
C. How is a lack of insulin related to heart disease?
D. How can diabetes lead to kidney disease?
Character Treatment 6
Hero: That condition might happen, far in the future, to someone who isn't doing enough to control the disease. [Upbeat tone.] But you're asking
great questions.
Both: [Rising tone.] How does diabetes cause that? All your organ systems have one thing in common: They rely on proteins to function. If your
body doesn't make enough insulin, sugar binds to those proteins and keep them from working. This is why some people need to inject themselves
with insulin.
Villain: Have you ever made crème brûlée? Take some custard—your proteins—sprinkle on sugar and caramelize it with body heat. [Chuckling]
You're making crème brûlée out of your body.
A. Earlier you mentioned treatment options.
B. Could you tell me more about what I can do to improve my prospects?
C. Will I have to inject myself with insulin?
D. I don't feel comfortable using needles.
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Character Treatment 7
Villain: [Nodding teasingly.] I bet you're terrified of needles, but in the early stages of diabetes …
Both: Injections aren't always necessary. Sometimes pills are enough. Getting plenty of exercise and eating a sensible diet are also key in stopping
the disease from getting worse. We can discuss lifestyle changes at your next appointment …
Villain: [Impatiently] … because I've got a waiting room full of people. You see, the trouble is your diet and exercise habits are so ingrained
they're almost impossible for you to change. So you might as well go straight to the pills or needles.
A. What's wrong with my current diet?
B. What kind of diet and exercise program do you recommend?
C. I feel I am already exercising enough.
D. Is there a type of exercise that is best for people with diabetes?
Character Treatment 8
Villain: Let's stop here. The first time you hear [pause] diabetes, you freeze. That's all you hear. You're thinking, “I'm going to lose a foot! I'll go
blind!” So there's really no point in talking about your case now. Take this brochure. Read it before your next appointment, and you'll be able to ask
better-informed questions.
Hero: It's important to quantify and monitor improvements in diet and exercise, because people tend to underestimate their food intake and
overestimate their exercise time. Working with a nutritionist and personal trainer can help with this. You might also consider joining a patient
support group. My patients have told me they have learned more in a couple of weeks at a patient support group than in six months of coming to this
office, because these groups are run by people who really know what it’s like to have the disease. Feel free to contact me if you have any questions or
concerns. I look forward to seeing you tomorrow.
Ending Treatment 2
Happy:
Nurse Larsson: “Great news, Dr. Richards! The American College of Physicians is honoring you with a Fellowship.”
Dr. Richards: “That is great news!”
Tragic:
Nurse Larsson: “Bad news, Dr. Richards! Meredith Pratley decided to go ahead with the malpractice lawsuit.”
Dr. Richards: “It's unfortunate she feels that way.”
Appendix B. Indices
Table B1
Correlations among dependent variables.
DV Trans Ident Emp Sym Cog Pers End
Transportation
Identification .63∗∗∗
Empathy .33∗∗∗ .34∗∗∗
Sympathy .37∗∗∗ .30∗∗∗ .75∗∗∗
Cognitive P.-t. .06 −.01 .16∗∗∗ .22∗∗∗
Persuasion .17∗∗∗ .04 .49∗∗∗ .54∗∗∗ .50∗∗∗
Ending Pleasure .04 .00 .16∗∗∗ .11∗∗ –.01 .11∗∗
Enjoyment .51∗∗∗ .44∗∗∗ .52∗∗∗ .46∗∗∗ .10∗∗ .33∗∗∗ .18∗∗∗
Note: ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
Table B2
Psychometric properties of the scale indices.
DV Items N M SD α αdrop Skew Kurtosis
Transportation 11 738 −0.04 0.86 .73 .75 0.12 0.15
Identification 8 738 −0.21 1.11 .79 .82 0.05 −0.73
Empathy 7 738 −1.20 1.21 .87 .88 0.71 0.04
Sympathy 6 738 −1.00 1.34 .89 0.48 −0.48
Cognitive P.-t. 11 738 1.14 0.70 .64 .67 −0.01 −0.32
Persuasion 8 738 0.34 1.18 .85 .87 −0.19 −0.49
Ending Pleasure 5 738 0.10 1.25 .92 0.01 0.13
Enjoyment 12 738 0.60 1.05 .90 .91 0.21 −0.15
Note: αdrop is the Cronbach α excluding the item with the lowest factor loading if its removal improved reliability. M, SD, and α are prior to rescaling and weighted
averaging.
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Table B3
Transportation
Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements about the consultation.
No. Item Loading Uniqueness
7 I felt like the events in the doctor's office were really taking place. .63 .60
6 After the consultation ended, I wanted to know what would happen next. .62 .62
10 In some small way, the consultation has changed my life. .58 .66
1 I felt immersed in the conversation with the doctor. .49 .76
8 When the consultation ended, I easily put it out of my mind.R .49 .76
4 The consultation made me feel like I was entering a new reality. .47 .78
5 The consultation felt intense. .47 .78
2 I was more focused on my surroundings than the doctor's office.R .36 .87
11 My mind was preoccupied with unrelated matters during the consultation.R .36 .87
3 I never really felt involved in the doctor's consultation.R .32 .89
9 I thought of how the consultation could have proceeded differently. .09 .99
Note: R indicates a reverse scaled item.
Table B4
Identification as Patient (Emotional)
Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements in your role as patient during the consultation.
No. Item Loading Uniqueness
2 I was fully absorbed in the role of patient. .81 .34
1 I felt like I was really the patient. .78 .38
3 I experienced the same emotions as a real patient would in that situation. .77 .40
7 I could really feel what it’s like to get bad results on a lab test. .66 .57
5 I could not identify with being the patient in the doctor's office.R .65 .58
8 I didn't feel sad when my blood sugar tested high.R .47 .78
6 As patient, I felt myself guiding the direction of the conversation for a while. .29 .92
4 I felt like I was still myself in my real surroundings.R .12 .99
Table B5
Empathy (Emotional) for Dr. Richards
Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements about Dr. Richards.
No. Item Loading Uniqueness
3 I can relate to Dr. Richards as a person. .90 .19
4 I understand how Dr. Richards feels. .89 .21
5 When Dr. Richards feels joy or disappointment, I can feel it too. .83 .31
2 I can feel how Dr. Richards feels to give patients bad news. .69 .53
1 I'd feel happy when Dr. Richards succeeds and sad when he fails. .68 .53
6 I didn't share Dr. Richards' emotional reactions. R .51 .74
7 I seldom experienced the same emotions as Dr. Richards.R .43 .81
Table B6
Sympathy for Dr. Richards (Empathetic Concern).
No. Item Loading Uniqueness
1 I'd worry if something bad happened to Dr. Richards. .82 .32
2 I sympathized with Dr. Richards during the consultation. .82 .33
3 I feel anxious and hopeful about what will to happen to Dr. Richards. .80 .35
6 If someone tried to take advantage of Dr. Richards, I'd feel protective of him. .75 .44
4 I don't really care how Dr. Richards feels. R .71 .49
5 Even if Dr. Richards were treated unfairly, I wouldn't care much.R .66 .56
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Table B7
Cognitive Perspective-Taking.
No. Items
1 Dr. Richards intended to keep me waiting.R
2 Dr. Richards believes I'm free of disease.R
3 Dr. Richards plans to retest me at his soonest convenience.
4 Dr. Richards thinks my lack of symptoms put me in the clear. R
5 Dr. Richards believes if a patient follows the treatment, diabetes would likely stop getting worse.
6 Dr. Richards thinks high blood sugar damages the body.
7 Dr. Richards would be surprised if I had Type 1 diabetes.
8 Dr. Richards believes his diet and exercise advice are effective if followed.
9 Dr. Richards intends to quit medicine.R
10 Dr. Richards plans to marry Nurse Larson.R
11 Dr. Richards postpones running lab tests.R
Table B8
Persuasion (Adherence Intention)
Indicate your level of agreement in your role as patient during the consultation. Strongly Disagree–Strongly Agree.
No. Items Loading Uniqueness
5 I'd inject myself with insulin 3min before each meal if Dr. Richards recommended it. .78 .40
1 I'd return to Dr. Richards for diabetes retesting. .75 .44
4 I'd double my number of meals and cut the quantity in half, if Dr. Richards said it would prevent complications. .75 .44
3 I'd ignore any treatment advice from Dr. Richards.R .73 .46
8 I'd make any lifestyle change Dr. Richards' suggests to stop the disease from progressing. .67 .55
2 If I were diagnosed as prediabetic, I would consult a different doctor instead of Dr. Richards.R .63 .60
6 I'd follow Dr. Richards' recommendation to exercise at least half an hour each day. .62 .62
7 I could not rid my diet of sugar even if Dr. Richards ordered it. R .23 .95
Table B9
Enjoyment (Narrative Appreciation)
Describe your overall experience of the consultation?
No. Item Loading Uniqueness
4 Entertaining–Dull .87 .25
3 Boring–InterestingR .84 .30
9 Fun–Tiresome .83 .32
5 Amusing–Tedious .79 .38
6 Unimaginative–ImaginativeR .77 .41
8 Enjoyable–Unpleasant .73 .46
1 Exciting–Ordinary .70 .51
7 Depressing–CheerfulR .54 .71
10 Awkward–AdeptR .53 .71
2 Suspenseful–Predictable .51 .74
11 Professional–Amateurish .43 .81
12 Humorous–Solemn .41 .83
Table B10
Ending Emotion
Happy: When Dr. Richards found out he was being awarded a fellowship, how did you feel?
Tragic: When Dr. Richards found out he was being sued for malpractice, how did you feel?
No. Item Loading Uniqueness
2 Satisfied–Disappointed .95 .10
1 Happy–Sad .91 .18
3 Annoyed–PleasedR .83 .31
5 Angry–ContentedR .79 .37
4 Amazed–Discouraged .71 .49
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Table B11
Character's Perceived Emotion (Manipulation Check)
Happy: When Dr. Richards found out he was being awarded a fellowship, how did you feel?
Tragic: When Dr. Richards found out he was being sued for malpractice, how did you feel?
No. Item Loading Uniqueness
1 Happy–Sad .96 .07
2 Satisfied–Disappointed .94 .11
3 Annoyed–PleasedR .92 .16
4 Amazed–Discouraged .83 .32
5 Angry–ContentedR .77 .41
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